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REPORT Part
Two -Saigon Evacuation Capt. Marius Burke Jr. This article was first printed in the Air America Log Jan,Feb,March 1990 Vo1ume 1 No 1 The
hasty and disorganized evacuation of Danang, if it served no other purpose,
set the stage for what Air America could expect in future evacuations,
little if any, support from using customers. At the same time they expected
us to do everything possible to effect a successful extraction of people at
the latest possible moment The security and well-being of Air America
employees seems to have been strictly an in-house problem. This situation
was further brought out during the Nha Trang evacuation, which, although it
represented less problems, still left us holding the bag. Because
of, or perhaps despite my experiences in the Danang evacuation, I was asked
to go to Nha Trang to handle flight operations for Air America. Upon arrival
around 9AM, it became obvious that an evacuation was already underway and
plans to go downtown for meetings/brieftngswould have been useless. The
Counsel General for Nha Trang was already in the process of departing for
Saigon in one of our Volpars. I thus found myself, along with another Air
America chopper crew, the only control and coordination left at the airport.
It was a surprisingly orderly crowd lined up for evacuation, particularly
compared to the mass hysteria that seemed to be the norm at Danang. There
were approximately 500 people on the ramp awaiting evacuation. This was more
than two helicopters could handle given the fact that fuel was a limited
commodity and we would not have enough to pull everyone out. About that time
a Flying Tiger DC-8 called in for instructions and requested a ramp be made
available for loading. We found a ramp and asked how many people they could
take out. The response was 500-600. This would have taken care of all
the people waiting and since the situation was calm, I instructed them to
come on in. About this time, the Nha Trang Consul General, who was now
halfway to Saigon and not aware of the situation at the airport, came up on
the radio and countermanded my instructions to the DC-8. Despite my
protestations and briefing on the situation, he commanded the DC-8 to turn
around and return to Saigon. So much from quality leadership from the upper
echelons. Fortunately,
the Koreans had sent an LST to Nha Trang to assist in evacuation operations.
We made contact with them and were able to shuttle approximately 300 people
to the LST in the bay before having to depart due to lack of fuel. Thus,
about 200 people were left behind who should have gotten out. I bring this
out only to set the scene for what could be expected in the future. As a sidelight to thought processes at the
time, in Danang we left with an ambulance from the German hospital parked in
our hangar. It had been brought there by the paymaster of the hospital who
was a friend of our Filipino mechanics and had the payroll for the hospital
inside. Since things were in such turmoil, he was unable to handle the
payroll and didnt want to retain possession for fear he would be
attacked. It amounted to 81 million piasters which at a rate of
approximately 300 to one, amounted to more than $250,000. During the final
evacuation when we came back to our compound at the base to try and find
additional Air America employees, my flight mechanic, Gil, told me about the
ambulance. I told him I would be happy to drop him off and try to come back
for him if he wanted to retrieve the money. He demurred, which was wise. In
the mail bag! carried upto Nha Trang, was apparently $lO,000-$20,000 cash
which also ended up being left behind. It was interesting how values seem to
change when faced with more important considerations. I dont believe
anyone lost any sleep about the money. I guess partly because of my
experiences at Hue, Quang Ngai, Danang and Nha Trang, I was asked to become
involved in evacuation plans at Saigon. A little more support was promised
in this particular case, but again, less than was-needed. It came very close
to becoming a disaster. Again it fell upon Air America to provide its own
security, support, etc., with less than minimum personnel and equipment. No
need to belabor this point as everyone involved is, or should be, aware of
it. PRELIMINARY COMMENTS: 1. Since it was found that evacuating
personnel from insecure areas such as fields and other easy access locations
was not a viable option, some method of segregating people who needed to get
out had to be found. An aerial recon was made of downtown Saigon and
thirty-two high rise structures were identified as potential helipad landing
areas. The plan was to move all appropriate personnel to these locations and
make accommodations for helicopters to land on the rooftops. It was felt
that by funneling people upwards and securing the lower entrances, we would
hopefully buy enough time to rescue people from the buildings before they
were overrun from below. A lot of time and effort was spent preparing
rooftop landing pads. However, although these pads were already obviously
compromised, clearance would not be given by the embassy to paint
Hs for easy recognition by the pilots. When the evacuation finally
started it was too late to do so. However, at the six locations that Air
America personnel were allowed to stay, we had gone ahead and done so
anyway. 2. Consolidation of personnel was a
big concern. In order to be effective, it was imperative that we be able to
get all our air crews and support personnel together in the minimum amount
of time. After much ado, we were given three apartments at 259 Troung Tuoc
Dung. This was obviously done for selfish reasons. Apparently, it was felt
that with a minimum number of Air America Crews at 259, the rest of the
government occupants would be assured transportation out. Strict
instructions had been given to Mr. Pickius, the Billeting Officer, not to
give any more apartments to Air America! At this time it became obvious that
the security of some of the areas where our personnel were living was
questionable at best. Most of the Filipinos were eventually talked into
moving on base, using company facilities, and accommodations were made for
the rest of our people at five other high rise buildings around town. It
should be noted that 259 was the best location for us as it was the closest
high rise to the airport available. At the time we moved into 259, there
were many empty apartments and many of the other apartments housed
Vietnamese. During the last few days more apartments were obtained, mainly
through back door tactics. 3. In addition to the relative
insecurity of many company helipads, marginal communications were a concern.
We were able to obtain a small number of FM radios from company sources plus
four from the New Zealand Embassy and their air crews. Thai was four more
than we got from the U.S. Embassy! It would be well to note that the New
Zealand air crews were allowed to use one of our trailers on the ramp to
base out of with their Bristol Freighter. DAO provided a lot of support to
us but we were never able to get portable radios from them for our company
pads. They never obtained additional hand fuel pumps nor was a UHF radio
capability set up for communications in the event our other radios were
jammed or inoperative. Surprisingly though, DAO was able to obtain radios
and a host of other equipment and facilities for their pads.
In addition to providing us with radios, the new Zealanders also had
good intelligence information. Two days before the end, they closed down
their embassy, made sure they had all personnel attached thereto and
departed. They seemed to know just what was going on and had no intention of
jeopardizing the security of any New Zealanders or local employees. They
left us with additional items of equipment upon their departure. The
Filipinos and Chinese employees and their families were in the most
precarious position since they were being harassed by their landlords and
the police with respect to helicopters landing on their rooftops. On the
28th of April the Chinese reported that the police threatened to shoot down
any helicopter that attempted to land at their pad. At this time I directed
all the Chinese and Filipinos to move out to the base that night, something
we had been trying to get them to do for weeks. This probably saved many of
them as very few were left downtown to be picked up the following day. 4. Access to refueling areas was
considered a critical item. At the time, we had only DAO and the Air America
ramp to rely upon for fuel. As it turned out neither one was satisfactory.
With the assistance of OSA people we located an abandoned USAID apartment
building, prepared it for landing and then removed all access ladder to the
roof Nikki Fillippi was very helpful in seeing that this was accomplished.
The plan was to position drum fuel on this roof for use as an alternate
refueling place should we lose our other locations. Six drums of fuel were
deposited on the roof that same day. Unfortunately, the local police spotted
the activity and apparently when they were unable to get on the roof, stated
they would shoot down any helicopter that came near. We could get no support
from the embassy on this issue as they had already refused our requests for
rooftop landings. We believed that occasional helicopter landings on each
of the 32 rooftop pads would get the population used to it and give us
more time before they panicked during an actual evacuation. This was the
case at 259 where I commuted on a daily basis between there and the airport.
The first landing drew a large crowd but after the second or third landing,
they paid little attention to our comings and goings. In any case, we lost
our backup refueling alternative. 5. On the 26th of April 1 went to
Vung Tau to try and assist the Filipinos who had taken their Vietnamese
families there in an effort to get them out on a Filipino LST. As usual, Air
America employees had last priority on the military airlift that was taking
place out of Ton Son Nhut airport. Thus, it was felt that their only option,
particularly, those with Vietnamese families and little or no official
documentation, was to get them on the LST that had been sent for that
purpose. Unfortunately, when they arrived at the dock to board shuttle boats
to the LST, the Vietnamese military refused to let them depart. As a result
there was a total of approximately 1000 women and children camped out on the
sand awaiting word of what to do. Naturally, the Filipino employees would
not leave their families until they were assured of their safe evacuation.
At the same time we needed the services of these employees if we were to
accomplish our missions. I was asked to go to Vung Tau and see what could be
done to take care of the situation. A meeting was set up with the Filipino
Minister of Affairs, Mr. Sabalones, who was in Vung Tau to oversee the
evacuation. We discussed several options to the problem, none of which
seemed feasible. Finally, I suggested we transport the families out by
helicopter, bypassing the Vietnamese at the port docks. Mr. Sabalones
staff was aghast at such a suggestion, but to Sabalones credit he came
right back and said if it were possible to do it. I would have his full
support His staff was doubly concerned that the Vietnamese would balk at
anyone departing without proper documentation, which few of the
Filipino family members possessed. Finally, in what was an apparently
deteriorating situation, I convinced Sabalones to allow everyone on the ship
regardless of paperwork status. With the use of my helicopter and the
assistance of others working for the various customers in the area who
allowed them to make shuttles when transiting through, we were able to move
over 600 people to the LST. The remaining 400 were moved by barge during the
night. Up until this time we had been unable to move any Air America
indigenous personnel out of Saigon through normal military airlift
evacuation channels. Once the mission of evacuating the Filipino families
was completed, many thanks were given for our assistance and I asked if
there was anything they could do for us. I asked Mr. Sabalones if he would
accept some of our company indigenous personnel since the LST apparently had
the capacity to take on at least 300-400 more people. He allowed that they
would allow them to be taken aboard if we could get a letter from the U.S.
Embassy accepting responsibility for them once they were transported to the
Phillippines. I felt this would not be a problem. I called Mr. Jacobsen, who
was Ambassador Martins secretary and right hand man, outlining the
situation and the offer that had been made. His response was I wouldnt
touch that with a ten foot pole!. For all I know you will be pulling ARVN
soldiers on board. No indigenous employees got out on the ship. Jacobsen
was then asked if he would be so kind as to send me a photo of himself:
Copies would be made for all flight crews so that when the time came to
evacuate we would know who not to pick up. As usual, he did not cooperate. 6. 1 had a number of meetings with
the Ambassador and various staff over the previous weeks and it became quite
apparent to me that they really didnt believe an evacuation would ever
take place. In fact, the Ambassador, in one conversation told me that he had
good information that Saigon was off limits to the North Vietnamese and they
would never push that far. Based upon what I had experienced the previous
month and the apparent panic on the part on the South Vietnamese I countered
with the statement that I felt we had no more than two weeks before it would
be over. I was speaking from a gut feel with nothing to substantiate but I
didnt realize how accurate my guess was. It turns out that information
had apparently been received from the lead Hungarian representative to the
International Control Commission (ICCS). And they believed him! 7. About a week before the end I
attended a briefing at the embassy. At the end of the meeting I was given a
special radio for communication with significant embassy staff members.
There were about a dozen names on the list. I remember the ambassadors
call sign was sweetpea. By this time I had taken to commuting from the
Air America ramp to our quartersat 259 on a daily basis despite instructions
from the embassy not to do so. My reasoning was that it was necessary to
establish a routine that the neighbors would get used to and not panic when
a final evacuation would begin. Additionally, it was becoming increasingly
difficult to get indigenous personnel on to the base. The gate guards would
not let them in unless they had significant documentation and paid bribes.
We used the helicopter to get around this. Ralph Begian, who was our Flight
Information Specialist, had worked very closely with on planning,
particularly in designating the various landing sites. Because of the close
coordination involved, he ended up moving into my apartment with me. As was
usual, when I returned from the embassy that evening with the radio and
other assorted weaponry that had been offered, including a grenade launcher,
sawed off shotgun, AR-15, PPKs. etc., Ralph was on the roof to meet me.
He picked up some weapons and the radio which had the names and call signs
of those persons on the net rolled up and squeezed under the handle. When we
got to the apartment I noticed that the list was missing! it had apparently
been blown away by the helicopter rotor wash. We feverously searched the
roof and then the surrounding area with no success. The next day at the
embassy I was reminded of the great security required to ensure that the
list not be compromised. I really had a hard time getting another copy
without arousing suspicion. It all became a moot point less than a week
later. 27 April: Received a call from the
Air America Operations Manager requesting us to find accommodations for a
customer at 259 (that was a switch). The customer happened to be a Mr. Jim
Collins, who at the time supposedly was a free lance writer out of
Washington, but who had previously worked for the Embassy for some years in
the Go Long and Vung Tan areas. He spent the night at 259 and the course of
conversation stated that was going to see Mr. Jacobsen at the Embassy the
following morning to arrange for the evacuation of military academy orphans
at Vung Tau. Jacobsen told him essentially the same thing he had told me the
day before. However, Collins had other contacts and ended up coordinating
with an Admiral Benton, receiving a blanket approval to proceed. This was
finalized late on the 28th. 28 APRIL: Collins arrived at the Air
America ramp around 1730 looking for me to take him to Vung Tau for final
coordination. It was understood that Air America indigenous personnel would
also have an opportunity to get aboard the ship that would be set up for
evacuation purposes. Due to the late hour, the only aircraft that had sufficient fuel and was available to go was 12F, a
Bell 204B. After takeoff it was discovered that only the UHF radio worked
VhF and FM were inoperative. The academy people at Vung Tau were contacted
and arrangements were made to have a barge at the docks starting at 0630 the
following morning for transport of personnel to an MSC ship. I was to be
overhead at 0600 to coordinate operations. We departed for Saigon sometime after
1900 and made contact with an aircraft at V17 on UHF at which time we were
advised that there was some activity at Saigon and we were not to go there
that night. (The base was under a bombing attack). Since it was now dark and
the weather was deteriorating I elected to head for the Blue Ridge which was
the command and control ship for the fleet. I had visited there on a few
occasions over the previous weeks to brief them on our role in any
evacuation and felt they understood what the plan was. Essentially, Air
America was tasked to shuttle personnel from downtown to the airport and
then the military with their larger helicopters would take them out to the
ships. The Blue Ridge was about 50 miles offshore. En route, I noticed the
lights of three aircraft in the area and asked what they were. The response
was that they knew of no aircraft in the area. We were on a one mile final
for landing on the Blue Ridge when a VNAF CH-46 cut in front of us and
landed, effectively blocking the small helicopter deck. We ended up
diverting to the USS Denver where we spent a short night. A coordinating
message was sent to Admiral Benton and he gave us the go signal for the next
days mission around midnight. 29 April: In view of the unknown
situation at Saigon, we departed the Denver around 0500, attempted contact
with Air America with negative results, so proceeded to Vung Tau. Unable to
find anyone at the docks and no barge was in sight. Went to the military
academy and was advised that they were waiting for word from Collins. After
unsuccessfully searching for Collins about an hour and finally making
contact with Saigon, it became obvious that the evacuation was underway.
Proceeded to the Blue Ridge to get fuel and also to get a situation update.
At 0700 met with General Carey and asked when the Marines were going to
support us. (Prior briefings had established that 6 hours prior to
evacuation, a Marine battalion would land at the airport to secure all
facilities). General Carey informed me that his hands were tied and he could
do nothing until clearance was
given by the Ambassador. The only information he had was that supposedly
several aircraft had been downed by SA7s at Saigon. We again departed, checked for
information on Collins at Vung Tau (there was still no contact) and
proceeded to Saigon We were told to hold outside the city by relay from
another aircraft and it appeared that all the other aircraft were shutting
down at the airport. After about 5 minutes of orbiting, it was decided to
head for the city and find out what was going on. Landed at DAO and shut
down to brief. Everything was in a turmoil so decided more could be
accomplished by proceeding with the evacuation of personnel. Took off with
minimum fuel and a load of passengers and headed for the ships. Landed on
the USS Dubuque to refuel and were told that a VNAF pilot had landed in an
unmarked blue and silver UH-lH and they had thrown it overboard. Since it
had no U.S. flag or Air America markings, they assumed it was VNAF. It was
likely one of our XW birds (Lao registry) They felt bad about the mistake. Continued attempts to contact Collins
at Vung Tau. While on the Dubuque we managed to change our FM radio with one
that had been removed from the ship that had been thrown overboard. During
our next search over Vung Tau, it was noted that the city was under a heavy
barrage of rockets and/or 130mm guns. Checked with people on the ground with
negative results; was making another recon when suddenly we received a
transmission on FM 60.00 which was our prearranged contact frequency.
However, a Vietnamese was on the radio, instructing us to land and pick up
Mr. Collins. It seemed peculiar that be did not use Collins call sign
Mountain. I requested to speak with Collins directly but was
constantly put off. A white panel was put out but when we descended, the
people on the ground ran for the nearby bunkers and when we got to about
1,000 feet off the ground we began receiving heavy ground fire. Under the circumstances it appeared
that Collins radio had been captured and very likely, Collins himself.
Proceeded to the academy and informed the military people there of the
situation and asked them to make another recon on the ground. Was then asked
to evacuate what was represented as Collinsfamily along with about 15
orphans and brought them out to the Blue Ridge. Checked with Vung Tau after
refueling but they had no news so proceeded to Saigon. Continued shuttling
people from the rooftops to the airport until fuel was required and then
took a load out to ships and refueled. Each time I checked with the folks at
Vung Tau regarding Collins with negative results. It should be noted that on the
morning of the 29th, without any U.S. military security, the Air
America ramp was literally overrun by Vietnamese military who took off with
a number of our helicopters. One
aircraft, possibly taken by an inexperience pilot managed to get over the
fence before it crashed, landing on its side.
It continued to run for hours before it finally ran out of fuel. Also, as feared, our fuel supplies had been hit by incoming
and our only source of fuel was from the ships which were about 100 miles
away. This severely restricted our capabilities and after only a few
shuttles from town we would than have to go to the ships for fuel. Alternate
fuel sources would have made a big difference. Alter almost 15 hours flying, we
refueled on the USS Cook and made what was apparently the last Air America
flight to Saigon. We circled all the landing zones but with the exception of
259, all were deserted. At 259 there were literally thousands mobbing the
helipad with Vietnamese calling on the radio for pickups, while on the same
frequency (45.90) what was apparently PRG (North Vietnamese), were stating
that they had the helicopter in sight and would shoot it down if it
attempted to land Since there were no known Americans or third country
nationals at 259 and in view of the mob problems encountered by the last
aircraft attempting pickups, this pad was bypassed. We landed at DAO and
departed with a load of Americans. I decided to make one last stop by the
Air America ramp to see if there may have been anyone left behind. We landed
next to what appeared to be an intact Volpar. For almost five minutes I
toyed with the idea of transferring our people to it and having the
capability of flying all the way to Bangkok or even Hong Kong. The thought
of bypassing the ships and avoiding days or even weeks aboard a ship was
very appealing. Although the aircraft seemed to be in good condition, I
figured there had to be something wrong with it, otherwise it would not have
been left behind. I was also concerned that should I shut down the
helicopter and then be unable to get out with the Volpar, we could
conceivably get stuck there, particularly since it was now dark. I elected
to take the bird in hand and we proceeded out to the USS Blue Ridge. After
being told what a good job Air America had done we were told to shut down.
Upon exiting the aircraft we were frisked and all survival equipment was
confiscated and thrown overboard. Communications ended at that time. We were
treated as refugees and were unable to determine if our services could he
further utilized. About a week later we arrived in the
Phillippines and from there flew to Hong Kong for debriefings and then back
home. SUBSEQUENT OBSERVATIONS: 1. It s unclear if the various ships
were fully aware of our actual mission. On the Blue Ridge, Commander
Christiansen obviously did not appreciate our key role. He forced Capt
Kendall to ditch his aircraft and tried to force another of our pilots
flying 35F to ditch after making just one trip to the ship. After removing
the doors, the Commander changed his mind and secured the aircraft forward.
It was not utilized for the rest of the operation, although nothing was
wrong with it! And this was at a time when Air America was the only
evacuation capability in operation! How such a misunderstanding could have
occurred, particularly aboard the command ship is hard to fathom. It was as
if they were in a state of shock. (Which they may have been!) 2. It is obvious that Air Americas
key role in the evacuation was never understood by all concerned. Newsmen
were under the impression that the Air America aircraft stolen by VNAF
pilots and subsequently crashed aboard ships were manned by incompetent Air
America pilots. Many also assumed that the Air America helicopters made only
one way trips out to the ships, looking out only for themselves. Such was
not the case and unless commanded by the ships to shut down, most continued
flying until unable to do so. In over 15 hours flight time that day, I only
got out of the cockpit twice. Virtually all refueling was done hot. 3. Incidentally, there was nothing
wrong with that Volpar. It was fully fueled and capable of a long flight.
This was the only example I am aware of where An Air America pilot did not
carry out the mission for which he was assigned. A very small blot on the
record. (Editors Note: To find out why the Volpar was left at the airport read Capt.
E. G. Adams account of his final flight from Saigon.) 4. Again, the experiences we had
during the evacuations of Danang and Nha Trang were repeated again at
Saigon. No one was concerned
about our welfare but we were expected to provide services for everyone else
and then fend for ourselves as best we could.
Let the record speak for itself.
It is just unfortunate that the many people who, despite operating
under less than ideal conditions and having little outside support, really
got the job done when it counted, have never received the recognition they
deserve. I salute all those
fine crews and support personnel of Air America who made it happen. |
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